VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE ACROSS TIME

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WHAT INSPIRES NON-VIOLENCE AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAM?

Some religious and historical factors[1]

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In January 2015, militants from the Islamic State (also known as *Da'ish*, ISIS or by other acronyms) burned alive a Jordanian air force pilot who had been captured by the terrorist organization. Condemnations from across the world were expressed on every medium. Of particular importance was the reaction of the Sheikh of the Azhar, one of the most important religious authorities in Sunni Islam. He reached out to the Qur'an for a religious pronouncement on the way the IS militants who committed this brutal act must be punished.[2] He invoked the following verse:

> The punishment of those who make war against God and His messenger, and roam the earth corrupting it, is that they be killed, or crucified, or have their hands and feet amputated, alternately.
>
> (Qur'an 5.33)[3]

In doing so, the Sheikh of the Azhar has exposed the complex interconnectedness between the discourses of violence and non-violence in Islam, an issue that we also come across in most religions and cultures. This relationship engages two main conceptualisations. On the one hand, we have the issue of definition, and, on the other hand, we have the issue of religious legitimisation. The former engages the assumptions that determine whether an act is one of violence or non-violence. The latter speaks to the many factors that empower each discourse and provide it with religious sanction.

The discourse of violence has religious and historical roots and factors that contribute to its formation and bestow legitimacy on it and by extension on those who commit acts of terror in the name of Islam. There is also a rich legacy of religious non-violence, informed by ideological and lived diversity, which has inspired over the centuries many Muslims and shaped their beliefs, ways of life and treatment of others (non-Muslims or 'other' Muslims). These two discourses have often clashed, and in certain situations, one eclipsed the other. Yet in some contexts, they coexisted and were pursued by the same actors. The statement of the Sheikh of the Azhar echoes precisely this complexity of coexistence of both discourses in the minds of many Muslims.

In this chapter, I will examine some examples of the religious and historical roots and factors that empower and legitimise the discourses of violence and non-violence. The selected cases are intended to provide a broad understanding of what makes each discourse seem legitimate and appeal to some Muslim groups. In this respect, I will also argue that the empowerment of the discourse of tolerance and non-violence cannot be achieved without delegitimising the ideological and historical lore that venerates and valorises violence in the name of Islam.

Islam, warfare and tolerance

Like most other religions, Islam does not have a fixed doctrine regarding violence/warfare or non-violence/tolerance. We often assume that a religion or an ideological system must have clear definitions and a consistency about lots of things, and we are regularly bombarded by questions about the position of Islam (or, for that matter, the Qur'an) regarding many issues, as if everything is coherent and clear. In my opinion, such inquiries only expose the relative naiveté of the inquirer, for what escapes him or her is that the way we think of coherence and clarity is primarily done along modern academic constructs. In complex religious systems like Islam, and in old scriptures such as the Bible and the Qur'an, coherence and clarity are definitely not the words that come to mind when reading them. Even though many try to provide clear and coherent answers, the reality is that we have plenty of contradictions and obscurities, which, traditionally, believers did not consider as constituting cases of incoherence or accepted and worked around them.

When I speak of religious and historical factors that are at the roots of certain modes of thinking and behaviour, I mean by that the way these factors shape the thinking process and actions of individuals or communities. In some ways, one can anticipate how a certain individual or community would react to certain challenges. If we take the United States as a case in point, a majority of Americans categorically refuse to consider any restrictions on the acquisition of firearms despite the insurmountable body of evidence that links the free access to weapons to the increase in social violence, racism and religious extremism. On the one hand, there is a sense of white supremacy that informs and emboldens particular attitudes, in that it is the fear from the dangerous 'other' that fuels the need to 'protect' oneself. On the other hand, there is the belief in the Second Amendment, which guarantees for each American the right to carry arms as an essential component of one's basic rights.

France is undergoing a similar trajectory with the rise of the Front National led by Marine Le Pen and its advocacy against immigrants. The attacks in Paris in 2015 only worsened the situation. The massacre of the staff of *Charlie Hebdo* on 7 January 2015 generated a massive shock and reaction that can be partly understood as emanating from the significance the French people place on the freedom of the press. This I say irrespective of whether in actuality the members of the press are 'really' free of any biases and irrespective of whether the people who marched in the streets of France even liked *Charlie Hebdo* or agreed among themselves on what that freedom meant. The attack generated the kind of reaction that one could have easily anticipated given the identity of the attackers and the nature of the target. If the same attack was committed by white Christians, we would have had a reaction, but it would have been different. It would have been labelled under a different set of motives. But in this case, the identity of the attackers – that is, 'Muslims' – and the assumption that the staff of *Charlie Hebdo* were 'French' produced the type of reaction that we all saw, even though two of those killed were 'Muslims' (the copyeditor of *Charlie Hebdo*, Moustapha Ourrad, and police officer Ahmed Merabet). There are those who were taken by a blind categorisation and thought of the attack as reflecting the Muslims' hatred to France and French culture and values. Others realised the complexity of the issue given that the attackers did not represent and act on behalf of all Muslims, especially that there were Muslims among their victims. In other words, while two Muslims were attacking a symbol of 'French' values, two other Muslims were killed promoting and protecting those values. The same can be said of the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 (and about attacks in Brussels, San Bernardino, Orlando etc.).

Thus, we are actually in a puzzle here: how does Islam produce people who end up on such opposite sides?

When we talk about Islam and Muslims, we need to clarify what we mean by these categories. It is in the presumptions and definitions which we associate with certain words that can either help us understand what they represent or mislead us partly or completely. The basic definition of Islam is that it is a monotheistic religion based on the unconditional belief in the God of monotheism. If we add anything else, we end up in the quagmire of Islamic sectarianism: some Muslims agree to what we add, others reject it. Moreover, in some contexts, this short definition is only partly true or not true at all. One needs also to define what is meant by religion and belief, but I will not deal with this at this point. Islam for some Muslims can be a cultural movement that has nothing to do with religion. Thus defining Islam only as a religion does not always help us understand what Islam is. Similarly, the definition of a Muslim can be someone who believes in the religion of Islam. But to follow from what I said earlier, this is correct only in as much as we are talking about one aspect of being a Muslim. A Muslim can also be an atheist who comes from a Muslim background. As a reminder, when we ask how many Muslims are around the world today, we are given the figure of approximately 1.6 billion. This figure does not differentiate between Muslims who are believers and those who are not, let alone speak to the utter disunity of Muslims at every level (language, ethnic, culture, sectarian, geographic, class etc.). It is very important for our discussion here to realise the limitation of any definition and that primarily when one advances a definition, it is made for convenience much more so than anything else. If we lose track of this basic fact, we fall victim to our own misconceptions.

Therefore, in some ways, when we say Islam, we need to keep in mind the limitations of what we are assuming and what we intend by the term Islam. To go back to the original question of this chapter – 'what inspires violence and non-violence in Islam?' – the answer depends on what we assume the word Islam to mean and the distinctions within Islam itself in terms of thought and adherents. After all, neither Islam nor the Muslims are uniform and monolithic.

In what follows, I will focus my investigation on the religious and historical factors that sanction violence and non-violence, keeping in mind that this is simply an aspect of the broader question. Narrowing the focus is meant to provide some clues about the role of religion and history in empowering each discourse, often along with other factors that will not be discussed in this chapter.

The religious and historical lore

There is a large body of religious and historical lore that has functioned and still functions as an inspirational model for Islamic violence and warfare. Those we call terrorists are in their own mind-set and worldview conducting a war not different from the wars that earlier Muslims have conducted according to the traditional narrative of Islamic history. They invoke particular religious pronouncements and doctrines as well as historical narratives that they believe speak to current circumstances. When they engage in battles, they believe angels fight alongside them in the same manner that angels fought alongside the first Muslims (Azzam 1986).[4] They appeal to particular verses in the Qur'an that furnish the ideology that makes them believe they are fighting a legitimate and lawful war against the enemies of God. They circulate among themselves particular literature that valorises martyrdom and promises divine blessings and rewards for those who die fighting. They also build a supportive community around them where everyone knows to some extent their role and their contribution to the cause.

But above all, before they even think of war, militant Muslims are conditioned to think that Islam is a perfect religion, and as such, it offers a solution to all the problems of the world. So yes, every Muslim militant today comes to the issue loaded with modern concerns, and in simple terms it is here where things start to escalate. If Islam offers the magical solution for all the problems of humanity today (and in the future), then rejecting Islam means that people of the world do not want to see a solution for those problems, hence their culpability. This modern ideology of militancy was disseminated in the influential works of Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979) of India/Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) of Egypt. These two tremendously significant ideologues mandated that 'good' Muslims must pursue a world revolution and employ jihad to force Islam on humanity (on Muslims and non-Muslims alike) because it is the only way for salvation on earth and the world to come (Mawdudi 1976; Qutb 1978).[5] In this respect, the individual Muslim who is under the influence of such an ideology is left with one choice: militancy.

1. The Qur'an

Many verses in the Qur'an promote warfare, and many other verses promote non-violence. Obviously, I cannot discuss them all here. I will

only select a few, especially those that are often cited in relation to warfare or tolerance.

In some instances, the Qur'an seems to argue that fighting is an act far more superior than worship. For instance,

> Are you indeed equating provision of water to pilgrims and caring for the Sacred Mosque with one who believes in God and the Last Day, and wages jihad in the path of God? They are not equal in the sight of God, and God guides not the evildoers. For those who believed and emigrated and waged jihad in the path of God, with their property and persons, are of higher rank with God. They are the true victors.
>
> (Qur'an 9.19–20)

Here, as in other verses (e.g. 4.95 and 3.196), the Qur'an seems to be saying that in the eyes of God, a person who only believes in God is not equal to a person who, aside from belief, risks their wealth and person waging jihad in the name of God. This interpretation is rather widespread in Islamic literature (e.g. Shafi'i 2013: 265; Ibn Taymiyya 2000: 78).[6]

A contrary message emerges in other verses where the Qur'an makes no distinction between those who believe, as in:

> God promises the believers, male and female, Gardens beneath which rivers flow, therein abiding for ever, and mansions glorious in the Gardens of Eden, and, greater than all this, the good pleasure of God. This is the greatest of triumphs.
>
> (Qur'an 9.72)

As this and similar verses (e.g. 3.198) attest, the promise of reward is made to all believers without any distinction made between them (gender, capabilities, or degree of faith).

If one puts all these verses together, the question that begs itself is whether God likes one group of believers more than another or likes them all the same. Does God reward one group more than another, or do they all get the same reward? The way the Qur'an answers them leaves the reader confused.

The Qur'an also includes verses that establish the duty of jihad and define those against whom the Muslims must wage jihad. In one case, jihad seems to be prescribed for all believers:

> God has purchased from the believers their persons and their wealth and, in exchange, the Garden shall be theirs. They fight in the path of God, they kill and are killed – a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Evangel and the Qur'an.
>
> (Qur'an 9.111)

In the history of jihad ideology in Islam, this verse has been consistently invoked to show that fighting in the name of God is an already-established obligation on all the believers, be that individually or collectively (Shafi'i 2013: 261–3; Banna 2006: 224).[7] Elsewhere it is the target of jihad that is defined, as in the verse popularly known as the sword verse (ayat al-sayf):

> Once the sacred months are shorn, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, arrest them, imprison them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every site of ambush. If they repent, perform the prayer and pay the alms, let them go on their way: God is All-Forgiving, Compassionate to each.
>
> (Qur'an 9.5)

In the context of chapter 9 of the Qur'an (entitled Repentance), Muslim scholars surmised that God gave the prophet Muhammad and his followers not only the permission but also set up the obligation to seek out and eliminate polytheism from all of Arabia. What is also interesting about verse 9.5 is that in Islamic thought on jihad, it is the first part that is often invoked, especially the part that reads: Once the sacred months are shorn, kill the polytheists wherever you find them (e.g., Qutb 1978: 64).

This verse speaks of polytheists in early seventh-century Arabia. Yet it has been read as applicable to polytheists everywhere and even to monotheists who, by rejecting or not living according to God's law, have become like polytheists (Qutb 1978: 69). Hence, verse 9.5 in the literature of jihadists (past and present) still has tremendous relevance and applicability. This is especially the case given verse 9.29, which is often associated with verse 9.5:

> Fight those who do not believe in God and the Last Day, and who do not hold illicit what God and His messenger hold illicit, and who do not follow the religion of truth from among those given the Book, until they offer jizya as sign of subjugation.
>
> (Qur'an 9.29)

The expression *those given the Book* refers here to the Christians and Jews. Verse 9.29 is popularly known as the *jizya* verse (*ayat al-jizya*). It has historically informed the position of Islamic law regarding the treatment of the people of the Book living under Muslim rule (which over the centuries came to include other monotheistic and semi-monotheistic groups such as Samaritans, Zoroastrians etc., and even Hindus). In return for paying the *jizya* tax, the Muslims are obligated to protect them.

To return to verse 9.5, it is a complicated verse, much more than I just presented. It starts by stating: *Once the sacred months are shorn, kill the polytheists wherever you find them*. One assumes that the divine decree has been delivered: to seek and kill the polytheists wherever the Muslims find them. But then the next part of the verse proceeds to say: *arrest them, imprison them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every site of ambush*. The question is how can one group arrest, imprison, besiege and lie in wait for another group if they already killed them? Or are these to be understood as different forms of treatment for the polytheists? The remaining part of the verse only adds more confusion: *If they repent, perform the prayer and pay the alms, let them go on their way: God is All-Forgiving, Compassionate to each*, which gives the impression that the only condition for releasing a polytheist is if they repent, perform the prayer and pay the alms. Does this imply submission or conversion? It is not clear, although conversion does not seem to be the case, since the polytheists are still treated as polytheists and permitted to 'go on their way'. Additionally, why start with an injunction to kill and then proceed to offer other forms of treatment that range from imprisonment to releasing?

The verse that comes after 9.5 complicates matters even more. It reads,

> If a polytheist seeks your protection, grant him protection until he hears the speech of God, then escort him to where he feels safe. For they are a people of no understanding.
>
> (Qur'an 9.6)

According to verse 9.6, the polytheists should be left alive, and the Muslims should only read to them the Qur'an and let them go in peace. Here as well, the puzzling question is why fight the polytheists if the final verdict is to leave them alone to keep practicing polytheism? Is verse 9.5 a decree for the treatment of polytheists or simply an angry rhetorical statement? There is no way to know, and whatever conclusion we come up with is simply an understanding that we as readers impose on the text by reading part of it and not all of it.

I should also add that my point here is not to say that the jihadists read the Qur'an incorrectly, or for that matter that Muslims who believe in non-violence are correct. My point is that each group reads those verses in a way that champions their case and argue that their reading is indicative of the Qur'an's entire worldview and final statement. By doing so, they dismiss or ignore the verses that contradict and undermine their position. A militant scholar would say that God in the sword verse pronounced that the fate of polytheists is to be killed by Muslims or forced to convert (Qutb 1978: 72–4); Qutb would even argue that the commandment to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam is God's final pronouncement that revokes all previous commandments (Qutb 1978: 72–4). A pacifist scholar, such as Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963),[8] would say that 'There is absolutely no justification for anybody, whoever it may be, to hold or profess that one of the ways in which the Mission of Islam has been propagated, has been conversion by means of the sword or by fighting' (Shaltut 1977: 37). Another pacifist would say that God mentioned the killing but followed it with a long list of exceptions that actually voids it of any applicable meaning (Abdel-Haleem 2010).[9]

The treatment of other monotheists is equally unclear in the Qur'an. Verse 9.29 prescribes a relationship of subjugation. Other verses, however, stipulate that fellow monotheists are not different from Muslims and are as dear to God as Muslims. Examples come in the following verses:

> Those who believe, and the Jews, and the Sabeans, and the Christians – that is those who believe in God and the Last Day and do righteous deeds – they should not worry about their fate or grieve.
>
> (Qur'an 5.69)

> Among the People of the Book are those who believe in God, what was revealed to you, and what was revealed to them. They are obedient to God and do not sell God's signs cheaply. For these, their assured recompense is with God.
>
> (Qur'an 3.199)

Needless to say, while the former verses have their audience (which includes jihadist and triumphalist Muslims), the latter verses appeal to Muslims who champion non-violence. If we ask which verses to

follow or which ones reflect the Qur'an's view, there is no way to know. Yes, Islamic thought found a solution for this problem: the notion of abrogation (*nasikh wa-mansukh*), in which some verses are believed to have cancelled the effect of other verses. But these are only scholarly efforts to impose on the Qur'an a consistency that is clearly absent in the text. The Qur'an itself is silent about which verses are abrogated and annulled and which verses are in effect and in full force.

2. *The Sunna of Muhammad and the historical tradition*

There is nothing in Islam that emboldens the thoughts and acts of Muslim militants more than the military aspects of prophet Muhammad's career. When the first biographers of Muhammad wrote his story, the military campaigns he led were presented as the highlights and verifications of his divine mission. This became more and more entrenched in Islamic thought and psyche as Muhammad's legacy grew and the Muslims looked back to him as a model on pretty much every issue, so much so that being a good Muslim in certain contexts was equated with emulating the Prophet's way of life and close adherence to his teachings (*Sunna* of Muhammad). The growth of Muhammad's persona allowed his *Sunna* to play a fundamental role in religious thought and life. That he was both a military commander and religious messenger meant for many Muslims that Islam is both a religion and a state. The debate over this precise issue of the separation of church and state in Islam is an unsettled debate and has been hotly contested by modern Muslim thinkers. It is the key feature of Islamic modernism, whereby we see Muslim modernists lining up either in support of it (Abdelraziq 2012)[10] or against it (Iqbal 1909; Khomeini 1979)[11] or proposing a middle ground (An-Na'im 1990).[12]

Muhammad's career has also inspired some Muslims to be militants, as suggested in the following hadith, which is quoted by Tibrizi (d. 1341) who compiled one of the authoritative collections of Muhammad's sayings or *Hadith* (Tibrizi 1963–65: 817).[13]

Muhammad said: 'If anyone is pleased with God as Lord, with Islam as religion and with Muhammad as messenger, Paradise will be assured to him . . . . There is also something else for which God will raise a servant in Paradise a hundred degrees between each two of which there is a distance like that between Heaven and Earth: it is Jihad in God's path; jihad in God's path; jihad in God's path.'

Thus, waging jihad became what many medieval scholars would call the sixth pillar of Islam. The military career of Muhammad is actually one of the most problematic aspects in that moderate Muslims have not been able yet to work around it. Some try to emphasise that the Prophet and his followers were compelled to fight oppression and injustice inflicted upon them (Shaltut 1977: 75; Abdel-Haleem 2010: 161) and that Muhammad's messengerhood manifested God's grace towards humanity, as in the verse *We sent you not but as mercy to humankind* (Qur'an 21.107). In the words of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (d. 1956),[14] the most influential modern biographer of Muhammad, the Prophet 'extended his fraternity to all men without distinction' (Haykal 2005: 536) and 'established the religion of truth and laid the foundation of the only civilisation which guarantees the happiness and felicity of man' (Haykal 2005: 503).

The historical tradition also offers countless examples of non-violence and violence. The early Islamic conquests of Syria are a case in point. When the Muslims ventured out of Arabia to conquer the ancient Near East, they did not have in mind to convert the population there to Islam. In their fight against the Byzantines, the Muslims received tremendous support from the local population. A few decades after that, Muslim historians started to commemorate the conquests in two different fashions. Some eliminated the crucial role of non-Muslims and looked at the conquests as setting the stage for the Muslims to subjugate and conquer by force the entire world. Others looked at it as an opportunity to settle, become civilised and partake in the building of a civilisation that continues and adds to the achievements of prior civilisations.[15]

For one group of Muslim triumphalist historians, the conquests had to be presented as a bloody chapter. For another group, the conquests featured an essential collaboration on the part of the local population. In other words, the comparison here is between a vision of Islam that considers the other as threat and source of corruption to Islam and Muslims versus another vision that thinks Islam needs the contribution of the other communities of the Near East and beyond and must borrow from them in order for it to survive and flourish.

The capture of Damascus in 635 CE is a fascinating example of the way the two discourses worked out a compromise. As one legend puts it, from one side, the local Damascenes opened the gates for the Muslims and welcomed them into their city; from the opposite side, the Muslim army breached through the defences and fought its way

through. To this day historians debate whether Damascus was captured by peace or by force or both.

In a nutshell, Islamic thought is nothing but the debate between these two trends. On the one hand, we have the discourse of triumphalism and exclusiveness. On the other hand, we have the discourse of the common heritage and interdependence with the rest of humanity. Islam the way we know it today is the product of this debate, which still goes on.

3. The complexity of the Crusader period

The Crusader period is invariably defined as one of the most brutal and bloody chapters of Christian–Muslim relations in the Middle Ages. Indeed, on both sides, the period witnessed and ushered some of the worst atrocities and violent religious rhetoric and propaganda. From the perspective of Europe and medieval Christianity, a peculiar religious mind-set played a significant role in the initiation and sustainability of the Crusading movement, which not only impacted the eastern Mediterranean but also transformed and shaped the religious, social and cultural makeup of Europe. When Pope Urban II initiated the Crusading movement in 1095 and then Pope after Pope made calls for renewed waves of Crusades, they never mentioned them as military campaigns. They called them pilgrimages. Yet many understood that a pilgrimage was more than a peaceful journey to Jerusalem. The pilgrim was a warrior for Christ, seeking through acts of violence the exoneration from their sins and eternal bliss. The Crusades were therefore about Christ. And if we make people believe, like the medieval church did, that they are condemned to eternal suffering due to their poverty and sinful ways of life, they would seize any opportunity to avoid such a wretched destiny. There is no doubt that there were many factors that helped launch and sustain the Crusades, but when all the factors combined and religion was thrown into the mix, it produced the phenomenon that we know.

On the Muslim side, the challenge of the Crusades gave rise to renewed and much more militant jihad ideology, which in some aspects had no precedent in Islamic history. I do not only mean that some Muslims called for jihad to defeat the invading Crusaders. What was new was the preaching of violence rhetoric first and foremost against groups labelled as the 'enemy within', fellow Muslims who, in the mind of those promoting this new rhetoric, weakened the unity of Muslims and the Muslim world and made them susceptible for invasion and subjugation. Thus, if there was any hope to eliminate the external threat, good Muslims should, through jihad and religious purity, wage a war to force a unity and eliminate the enemy within (Mourad and Lindsay 2013).[16]

Archaeology and material culture complicate this story and show a world in which Crusaders and Muslims coexisted and cooperated on many levels (Ellenblum 1998).[17] This reality can also be gleaned from some historical sources, albeit indirectly. In other words, no one wrote about it in a way to celebrate and justify it, but many contemporaries attested to its existence. The cases of religious and social tolerance between Muslims and Christians during the Crusader period are some of the least-known facts.

Some evidence suggests that the Crusaders were very attentive and considerate to Muslims' religious sensitivities, and other evidence points to the Muslims being sympathetic to certain Christian religious sensitivities and rights. A few examples give us a clear picture that, aside from occasional war, there were serious attempts at tolerating the other, and in a few cases, the same people were involved in the promotion of violence and non-violence. One fascinating example comes from the writings of the Muslim traveller Ibn Jubayr (d. 1217) from medieval Spain when he described his visit to the city of Acre:

> To the east of the city is the spring called the Spring of the Cattle, from which God brought forth the cattle for Adam – may God bless and preserve him. The descent to this spring is by a deep stairway. Over it is a mosque of which there remains in its former state only the mihrab, to the east of which the Franks have built their own mihrab; and Muslims and infidel assemble there, the one turning to his place of worship, the other to his. In the hands of the Christians, its venerableness is maintained, and God has preserved in it a place of prayer for the Muslims.
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> (Ibn Jubayr 2001: 318–9)[18]

Ibn Jubayr's visit to Acre took place in September 1184. He witnessed Muslims and Crusaders gather to worship in the same sacred spot where God caused a miracle for Adam. Each group prays without disturbing the other. What we have here and in many similar cases are examples of a common religious heritage and sites to which Muslims and Christians (and often others as well) each laid a claim and found ways to share. Probably the most famous case of this heritage is

Jerusalem. Yet the words of Ibn Jubayr reflect his intolerance at what he observed. He was genuinely annoyed and disturbed at the sight of fellow Muslims living in harmony with the Crusaders and, even worse, practicing their religion under the protection and respect of the Crusaders.

Another example of this trend comes from the reign of the Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil (d. 1238), who had to deal with the threat of two major crusader campaigns: the Fifth Crusade in 1219–1221 and the Crusade of emperor Frederick II in 1229. In both cases, and even though al-Kamil had the power to stand up to the Crusaders, his first reaction was to opt for non-violence. To the leaders of the Fifth Crusade, he proposed to hand over the city of Jerusalem and a large sum of money. His overture was based on a realization that the Christians have a religious right to their sacred places. Al-Kamil's major concern was to maintain Muslim access to the Haram area – which includes the sites of the Dome of the Rock and the Aqsa Mosque, both of which are tremendously significant to Muslims. In the case of the Fifth Crusade, the leaders rejected al-Kamil's proposal, which ultimately led to war and the defeat of the Crusader army. In the second case, there was not a single drop of blood shed, for al-Kamil and Frederick worked out a peaceful resolution, and we can get an idea of it in the story about the circumstances of Frederick's entry into Jerusalem and visit to the Haram, as related by the Muslim historian Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1256):

> In this year, the emperor Frederick II entered Jerusalem while Damascus was under siege. A few marvellous things occurred to him while there. Among them was that when he entered the Dome of the Rock, he saw a priest sitting near the mark of the foot, collecting parchments from the Franks who came. He drew near to him as if to ask for a prayer, but instead smacked him and threw him down on the floor, saying: 'You pig, the Sultan was gracious towards us that he let us visit this place and you do in it these things! If any one of you came to this place in this way again I will kill him'.
>
> Al-Kamil had requested from jurist Shams al-Din, chief-judge of Nablus, to instruct the muezzins not to deliver a sermon from the pulpit or make the call to prayer in the Haram as long as the Emperor is in Jerusalem. The judge forgot to inform the muezzins. During that night, muezzin 'Abd al-Karim ascended the minaret before dawn time and read the Qur'anic verses that dealt with the Christians, such

> as *God did not take to Himself a son . . .* (Qur'an 23:91), *this is Jesus, son of Mary . . .* (Qur'an 19.34), and similar ones. When dawn came, the judge summoned 'Abd al-Karim and said to him: 'What have you done? The Sultan decreed such and such'. 'Abd al-Karim replied: 'You never told me this. I won't do it again'. The second night, 'Abd al-Karim did not ascend the minaret. When dawn came, the Emperor summoned the judge and said to him: 'O judge, where is that man who yesterday ascended the minaret and recited those words?' The judge informed him what the Sultan had instructed. The Emperor said: 'You did wrong. Do you, O judge, change your rituals, law, and religion because of me? Were you with me in my country would I have annulled the ringing of bells because of you! By God, by God, do not do this or you will diminish in our opinion'. He then distributed money to the custodians, muezzins and dwellers, giving each person ten dinars.
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> (Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi 1951: 655–7)[19]

As in the case of Ibn Jubayr, Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi reported this story as part of his condemnation of sultan al-Kamil for betraying Islam by giving back control of part of Jerusalem to Frederick. Nevertheless, as both narratives indicate, the age was not only ruled by violence between two civilisations (Europe and Muslim World) and two religions (Christianity and Islam). There were many actors and groups who pursued other options.

One notable case comes from the time of Saladin, the paramount Muslim champion who 'crushed' the Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin (1187) and liberated Jerusalem, and Richard the Lionheart, the Christian king who left his kingdom and rushed to stop Saladin and rescue the Holy Land. The two fought each other to utter exhaustion in 1191–92. At the end, they came up with an astounding proposal: have Saladin's brother al-'Adil (who became sultan after Saladin) marry the sister of Richard the Lionheart, Joanna of Sicily, and the married couple would jointly rule over Jerusalem and Palestine (Ibn Shaddad 2002: 187–8).[20] The deal was meant as a huge compromise to end, once and for all, the animosity and warfare between the two camps. It fell apart because Christian priests convinced Joanna that she could not marry a Muslim. To keep things in perspective, Saladin and Richard the Lionheart, as with Frederick and al-Kamil, did not pursue peace and non-violence throughout their respective careers and

with every situation. They were brutal warlords. Yet they could also envision in some situations non-violence as a better way than violence. This brings us back to an issue raised earlier, namely the fact that violence and non-violence can be pursued by the same actors, simultaneously or at different time.

These are only a few out of countless examples from the Crusader period that, alongside war and conflict, there existed widespread reality of non-violence and cooperation. Why these episodes were never made into a narrative on tolerance has to do with the legacy of the Crusades. Both Europe and the Middle East had their reasons to rethink the Crusades as a movement of savagery and barbarism. Starting in the Renaissance, the idea of rebirth necessitated the presentation of the Middle Ages as the age of barbarism in Europe, and so what transpired between the sack of Rome in the fifth century and the fifteenth century was nothing worth remembering or celebrating. Others in Europe looked at the Crusades as a medieval predecessor of European colonial venture, and thus claimed its military glory against an uncivilised colonial subject (e.g., Riley-Smith 2003).[21]

The Muslims too had their reasons. The expansion of Europe and its encroachment on Islamic lands starting in the eighteenth century necessitated a counter discourse that presented the Europeans as the new Crusaders. For such a discourse, presented and advocated in most Muslim textbooks as in Sa'id 'Ashur in his influential two-volume study on the Crusades ('Ashur 1963),[22] only the example of fighting the Crusaders was relevant. Those cases of non-violence and cooperation were not only irrelevant but damaging to this Muslim reactionary discourse. So the period of the Crusades in the Middle East is remembered today according to the prejudices of modern historians serving these two agendas (often without being aware of them).

4. Medieval Spain and Islamic dissimulation

In 1492, Granada fell to the Reconquista and Islamic rule in Spain, which had started in 711, came to an end. Many Muslims converted to Christianity. Many others were forced to leave either as a result of aggressive policies pursued by the Christian rulers and the Catholic Church (including the Inquisition) or heeding religious fatwas issued by Muslim jurists who categorically rejected and condemned as heretic any Muslim who accepted to live under Christian rule. Yet many Muslims in Spain refused to leave their villages and towns. They stayed and went on practicing Islam, often in secret. They became known in

Spanish as Moriscos. The question that is of tremendous relevance here is the following: What were the guidelines that sustained their religious identity against all the pressure of conversion and assimilation?

The Moriscos were anxious to remain Sunni Muslims, and they sought assurances that living under and compliance with Christian rules and customs would not compromise their faith. Several jurists, such as Wahrani (d. 1511) of Morocco, came to the rescue and issued fatwas that permitted the Moriscos to eat pork, insult the prophet Muhammad and proclaim Jesus as the Son of God if they were forced to and many other things traditionally considered prohibited in Islamic law. These jurists justified their rulings based on the creed of dissimulation or *taqiyya* (Stewart 2013).[23] As it is clear by now, this is another case in which Muslims have historically split over an issue and came up with contradictory religious injunctions that relate to violence and non-violence in the face of certain circumstances.

The doctrine of dissimulation is precisely an anti-violence doctrine. Its purpose is to eliminate violence from both ends. On the one hand, there is the urge of a community to resort to violence to resist and fend off oppression imposed on it by a dominating group. On the other hand, there is the violence against that community to force it to leave its beliefs and assimilate into the dominating group. Even though dissimulation is in substance a deceptive process (professing overtly what one denies covertly), it resorts to non-violence and thus alleviates hostility by granting religious legitimacy to behave in ways that seem to the dominating group as if the oppressed group have assimilated.

Dissimulation is generally known as a doctrine practiced by the Shi'is throughout Islamic history (Kohlberg 1995: 345–80).[24] They picked up overt Sunni practices in order to avoid Sunni persecution. It is also a well-established Sunni doctrine rarely invoked but much discussed in Sunni religious literature (Stewart 2013). The case of the Moriscos in Spain is one of those rare moments when the doctrine was put into practice by Sunnis. That this ultimately did not help them has little to do with dissimulation and more to do with the barbarism of the Spanish Inquisition and Christian extremism at the time.

5. The Ottoman legacy and the Turkish model

In the last few decades, Turkey has been hailed as the model of a modern, tolerant Islam that many believe must become the face of the new Islam. We see Turkish writers celebrating it as a matter of 'fact' (Akyol 2011);[25] albeit one that echoes a deeply misinformed chauvinism. The

Western fascination with Turkish Islam as allegedly most peaceful and liberal belies an ugly legacy of the Turkish exceptionalism, namely its history of religious and ethnic violence. The first case of genocide in the twentieth century was committed in 1915 by the Ottoman Turkish army against the Armenian population, with more than 1.5 million Armenians perishing. There is no doubt that the issue was fuelled by political suspicion that the Armenians were conspiring with the enemies of the Turks. Thus, the dominant forces within Turkish society (in both political and religious circles) at the time came to the realization that the Armenians must be uprooted and eliminated in order to maintain what remained of the Ottoman empire, which by that time was transitioning to a new Turkey that gave priority for its Turkish subjects against all others.

The Armenian genocide of 1915 has its roots in massacres and anti-Armenian religious rhetoric that was widespread in Turkey in the 1890s (Akçam 2006).[26] Yet there is also a rich history or tolerance of Armenians under the Ottomans, which saw many of their figures rise up to occupy influential roles in the economy, society and even in the Ottoman administration. So much so that the Armenians were nicknamed *millet-i sadiqa* or the friendly sect. One can even speak of the Ottoman empire as featuring a widespread tolerance of minorities during its golden age of expansion and conquests, but when it started to lose territory and shrink, the sentiments against the minorities were transformed into suspicion, hence the violence against them. It is therefore the case that religion was not the only factor that shaped the treatment of minorities by the Ottomans, and that politics determined the way religion was employed to legitimise the way Turks treated others (be that violent or non-violent).

The Armenian genocide was not the only case of systematic violence against other groups in Turkey. Similar policies of extermination were pursued against Turkish Greeks (close to 15 per cent of the population) who were forced to leave in two major episodes of pogroms in 1923 and 1955, and later in northern Cyprus in early 1970s (Anderson 2009: 392–471)[27] when Turkey invaded the northern part of the island. There has been also systemic persecutions of Kurd and Alevi minorities.

Moreover, these cases of state-sponsored persecutions and genocides are not symptomatic of the secular system in Turkey. The current Islamic government, which has been ruling the country since 2003 under Erdoğan, pursues them against Kurds and Alevis in the same

rigor as done in earlier decades. Despite the fact that many Kurdish politicians are elected into the Turkish parliament, which should have provided them protection from state intimidation, the laws in Turkey have been altered to allow the regime to strip the Kurdish MPs of their parliamentary immunity, kick them out of parliament and put them in prison. More importantly, most of the political apparatus in Turkey today defends these policies and persecutes any voices that dare to bring them up, be that at the local or international levels, a case in point being the threats that the Turkish government issued and delivered to many German MPs of Turkish origin for supporting the German Parliament vote in June 2016 to recognise the Armenian genocide. In this respect, Turkey is an amazing case of the interconnectedness of violence and non-violence in modern Islam, where both discourses have been pursued by the same actors for different ends. On the one hand, Turkey is eager to showcase to the world a face of a liberal and tolerant Islam and is also working earnestly to join the EU. On the other hand, Turkey also displays dangerous levels of religious and nationalistic violence and intolerance towards all opposition and minorities that have survived its elimination policies.

6. Modernity and the rise of Islamic terrorism

In the modern period, the Muslim world witnessed two major events that have tremendously impacted the rise of what we commonly label 'Islamic terrorism'. They are the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the jihad war in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of the country in 1978.

Several factors joined to make those two events very impactful on many Muslims. The disillusion with socialism, nationalism and modernity as vehicles that could solve the problems of the Muslim world pushed many Muslims to think of Islam as the solution. The fact that they have lived for close to a century under non-religious rule (colonial or national) meant that they did not object to reinjecting religion into political life the way the Muslims did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when many saw religion in a negative light.

That Islam is the solution was not a new ideology. It was expressed by countless reactionary modernists from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – such as Chiragh 'Ali (d. 1895) of India, Namik Kemal (d. 1888) of Ottoman Turkey, Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905) of Egypt and Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (d. 1985) of Sudan. These modernists objected to growing popular trends that advocated for

traditional Islam to be heavily reformed and relegated to the personal sphere. The difference is that in the second half of the twentieth century, the slogan started to gain huge momentum and receptive ears. The success of the Mullahs in Iran in toppling the Shah, one of the most powerful 'puppets' of the West, and the successes of the jihadists and their 'defeat' of the Soviet army in Afghanistan convinced many in the Muslim world that through militancy, Muslims can achieve what socialists, nationalists and *mustaghribs* (Muslim Westernisers) promised but failed to achieve.

In Sunnism, modern jihadism looked for precedents and legitimizations from Islamic religion and history. The violent ideology of jihad developed in the Crusader period spoke to the current conditions: attack by the Christian West and culpability of many Muslims in creating a weak Muslim world. Despite many differences, modern jihadists approached the modern challenges with similar mind-set to those of medieval jihadists (Mourad 2017).[28] Hence, the targets of many jihadists (such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda) are primarily fellow Muslims.

In Twelver Shi'i communities, the Iranian revolution intensified the religious rhetoric that some Shi'is are familiar with, and in which many are brought up. It is a religious and psychological rhetoric that makes them believe they are *mustad'afun* (oppressed and exploited) and subject of a historical discrimination that started at the time of their first imam 'Ali, culminated in 680 with the struggle and slaying of his son imam Husayn (the central figure of Shi'ism), and still continues to the present day. In this context, the individual Shi'i brought up in such a mind-set is made to believe that the evil forces in this world have always been conspiring against Shi'is and that one's duty is to stand up against evil whenever there is a chance. It is more than that. Imam Husayn's struggle becomes a perpetual struggle, whereby every fight is a fight in which the life of imam Husayn is at stake. Thus, every Shi'i becomes in some ways imam Husayn. Given the right set of conditions, an individual Shi'i brought up in such an emotionally loaded religious psychology could easily resort to violence. It also explains why thousands of Shi'i fighters from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and elsewhere converge on the battlefields in Syria, Iraq and Yemen to fight Sunnis and commit indescribable atrocities against fellow Muslims. For them, it is the same epic fight that still rages on. It should be noted as well that Shi'ism has a very developed practice and doctrine of dissimulation intended to channel such grievances away from violent outbursts.

So given certain circumstances and conditions, religion and history tend to precondition people and place tremendous psychological pressure on them to act in certain ways. This is not unique to Islam, and if we extend our understanding of religion to mean any form of belief (be that in a deity or a concept), we realise that religion is pretty much everywhere around us.

Having said this, we should not forget as well that religion simultaneously impacts and is shaped by people. In this respect, modernity also introduced new Islamic movements that advocate non-violence and condemn violence (Boisard 1988).[29] Muslim thinkers such as Rachid Ghannouchi have expressed the view that Muslims in the West should completely adapt to Western democracy, be positive participants and accept the rules of the societies in which they live (Ghannouchi 1993).[30] Unfortunately, the voice of this alternative Islam is less forceful than the voice of fanaticism and violence and the mainstream media does not seem interested in it.

Concluding reflections

It should be clear from this presentation that Islam does not have a single voice or position on the issue of violence and non-violence. Whether we look at the Qur'an, the career of Muhammad, the historical tradition and so forth, we find no simple answers. The picture gets more complex as we move away from the narrow scholarly/textual Islam and into the broader Islam as lived. It stands to reason, therefore, that in some ways, Islam has positions that Muslims pick and choose on the basis of their circumstances. Scholars often converge on texts in order to determine what is Islamic. But what makes something Islamic is also what Muslims do. If we restrict our understanding to what religious scholars want us to believe, we fall into the trap of thinking of Islam according to their agendas and biases, and even there we do not have any clarity on whether Islam promotes violence or non-violence.

Having said this, it would be presumptuous to reduce the complexity shown in this chapter into a coherent conclusion. This is all the more the case if we realise that today many Muslim voices (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, the Azhar and so on) present themselves as the face and voice of a moderate and peaceful Islam, yet they commit in the name of Islam many an atrocity (be that directly or through their sponsorship of terrorist organisations) and valorise the religious and historical lore that ties Islam to violence.

Non-violence should not be pursued as part of a strategy to keep one's options open or a rhetorical ploy to placate non-Muslim powers and audiences.

The modern global age is forcing everyone in the world (be they individuals or groups) to find ways to maintain their beliefs and tolerate those of others. The process can be confusing and unsettling, and for many it is. Some just give in. Some resist. Some adapt. This is not the only time in human history when different ideologies and religious systems have competed. After all, the history of humanity has been an open arena in which everything was tested, challenged and forced to adjust. Europe did not become tolerant and humanitarian overnight. It was only after centuries of religious intolerance, barbarism, brutal carnages and wars that Europe emerged after the Second World War very sensitive to its own abuses and keen on protecting freedom, democracy and human rights (though mostly applicable in Europe).[31] Similarly, in the United States, slavery, racism and religious intolerance were rampant because history and religion were made to legitimise them. The process of their becoming outlawed and shunned by the dominant society involved not only laws but also a systematic inquiry into the role of religion and history in valorising the horrible attitudes and institutions that sustained them. The emergence of the Trump phenomenon and the crowds attracted to his rhetoric only prove how difficult it is to uproot these tendencies from the American society and how much work there is still to be done. This is not to mention that the ideals that the US promotes at home do not seem to govern its policies around the world.

The rich diversity and division within Islam is the outcome of the long process of adaptation and change that unfolded over more than 1,400 years. Out of it came the good, the bad and the ugly in Islam. The Muslims are not unique in this. However, in this particular time, they are facing a unique challenge, which is as much self-inflicted as it is the outcome of failed policies of the US and other world powers. Most Muslims find themselves more and more torn between ideologies that seek to label them according to uncompromising polarisations: either with us or against us, either French or not French, either pro-Erdoğan or anti-Erdoğan, either Sunnis or Shi'is, either with the war on terror or against the war on terror, either jihadists or traitors, either Muslims or infidels. While choices seem clear to an aggressive few, the majority of Muslims are frightened, clueless, voiceless and above all passive. It remains to be seen if this widespread passivity gives way to a more assertive and positive voice.

Notes

1 This paper was originally presented at the Institut d'Études Avancées (IEA) de Nantes (France) on 16 June 2015. It draws on materials that are part of a book under preparation, entitled *Islam between Nonviolence and Violence*. I would like to thank the IEA for the five-week fellowship (May-July 2015) that allowed me to write the paper. I am also grateful to Sudhir Chandra for reading a draft and providing me with valuable comments.

2 It is not my purpose here to address the refusal of the Azhar to declare the militants of the Islamic State non-Muslims.

3 The full declaration was issued and published on the Azhar's webpage on 4 February 2015 and reported by several news outlets. See for instance, www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRZ8coofRm0, accessed 5 May 2016. It was also reported in the *New York Times* by Rod Nordland and Anne Barnard, 'Militants' Killing of Jordanian Pilot Unites the Arab World in Anger' (www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/world/middleeast/arab-world-unites-in-anger-after-burning-of-jordanian-pilot.html?_r=0, accessed 5 May 2016). Translations of the Qur'an are based on Khalidi, Tarif (transl.). 2008. *The Qur'an*. London: Penguin Books.

4 Azzam, Abdullah. 1986. *Signs of ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghan*, ed. A.B. Mehri. Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers; and 'Umar, 'Umar A. 1999., *al-Jihad fi sabil Allah*. Damascus: Dar al-Maktabi. Azzam was a very popular ideologue who was involved in the indoctrination and transfer of Arab jihadists to Afghanistan. He was assassinated in Peshawar (Pakistan) in 1989, leaving a celebrated legacy among modern jihadists. His book was published in Jordan in 1986.

5 Mawdudi, Abul al-A'la. 1976. *Jihad in Islam*. Lahore: Islamic Publications; and Qutb, Sayyid. 1978. *Milestones*. Beirut: Holy Koran Publishing House. Mawdudi's Jihad in Islam was first published in 1939, and Qurb's Milestones was first published in the 1964.

6 Al-Shafi'i. 2013. *The Epistle on Legal Theory*, ed. and transl. Joseph E. Lowry. New York: New York University Press; and Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmu' al-Fatawa*. 2000. Vol. 19 (part 35), ed. M. 'Ata. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya. Shafi'i (d. 820) was one of Sunni Islam's most celebrated jurists and made a huge impact on Sunni jurisprudence. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1238) was an accomplished theologian and jurist, and his writing forms the foundational and inspirational material for modern jihadism.

7 Al-Banna, Hasan, *Kitab ul Jihad*, in Sayyid Qutb. 1986. *Milestones*, ed. A.B. Mehri, pp. 217–240. Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers. Banna (d. 1949) was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in Egypt in 1928 (also known as the *Ikhwan*).

8 Shaltut, Mahmud. 1977. 'The Koran and Fighting', in R. Peters, *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam*, pp. 26–79. Leiden: Brill. Shaltut was an influential religious reformer and became the Sheikh of the Azhar between 1958 and 1963.

9 Abdel-Haleem, M. A. S. 2010. 'Qur'anic 'Jihad': A Linguistic and Contextual Analysis', *Journal of Qur'anic Studies*, 12: 147–166.

10 Abdelraziq, Ali. 2012. *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*, transl. M. Loutfi. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. When this book

was published by Abdelraziq (d. 1966) in Cairo in 1925, it caused a huge crisis, and some religious leaders called for his execution.

11 Iqbal, Muhammad. 1909. 'Islam as a Moral and Political ideal', *Hindustan Review*, July: 166–171; and Khomeini. 1979. *Islamic Government*, transl. Joint Publications Research Service. New York: Manor Books. Iqbal (d. 1939) was a major Muslim political figure in India and is considered the spiritual father of Pakistan. Khomeini (d. 1989) is the Shi'i leader who orchestrated the Iranian revolution and set up the rule of the Supreme Leader (*Wilayat al-Faqih*) in contemporary Iran.

12 An-Na'im, 'Abdullahi. 1990. *Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. An-Na'im is a renowned Muslim reformist, who is also a professor at Emory University (USA).

13 Al-Tibrizi. 1963–1965. *Mishkat al-Masabih*, transl. J. Robson. Lahore: S. M. Ashraf.

14 Haykal, Muhammad Husayn. 2005. *The Life of Muhammad*, transl. I. Faruqi. Plainfield: American Trust Publication. Haykal's book was originally published in 1933 in Egypt.

15 For the problematisation of the 'Islamic' conquests, see Hoyland, Robert G. 2015. *In God's Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For the assimilation drive, see, for example, Gutas, Dimitri. 1998. *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries)*. London: Routledge.

16 Mourad, Suleiman A. and Lindsay, James E. 2013. *The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period: Ibn 'Asakir (1105–1176) of Damascus and His Age*. Leiden: Brill.

17 Ellenblum, Ronnie. 1998. *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

18 Ibn Jubayr. 2001. *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr*, transl. R. Broadhurst. New Delhi: Goodword Books.

19 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi. 1951. *Mir'at al-zaman fi ta'rikh al-a'yan*. Vol. 8 (part 2). Hyderabad: Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-'Uthmaniyya.

20 Ibn Shaddad. 2002. *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, transl. D.S. Richards. Aldershot: Ashgate.

21 Riley-Smith, Jonathan. 2003. 'Islam and the Crusades in History and Imagination, 8 November 1898–11 September 2001', *Crusades* 2: pp. 151–167.

22 'Ashur, Sa'id. 1963. *al-Haraka al-salibiyya: safha mushriqa fi tarikh al-jihad al-'arabi fi al-'usur al-wusta*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglu al-Misriyya.

23 Stewart, Devin J. 2010. 'Dissimulation in Sunni Islam and Morisco Taqiyya', *al-Qantara*, 34.2: 439–490. For a good survey of Muslims in Spain after 1492, see Harvey, L.P. 2005. *Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

24 Kohlberg, Etan. 1995. 'Taqiyya in Shi'i Theology and Religion', in H. Kippenberg and G. Stroumsa (eds.), *Secrecy and Concealment: Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions*, pp. 345–380. Leiden: Brill.

25 Akyol, Mustafa. 2011. *Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty*. New York: Norton.

26 Akçam, Taner. 2006. *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*. New York: Metropolitan Books.

27 Anderson, Perry. 2009. *The New Old World*. London: Verso.

28 Mourad, Suleiman A. 2017. 'Why Did Ibn Taymiyya Hate Mount Lebanon? An Inquiry into the Medieval Ideology of Muslim-on-Muslim Violence', in A. R. Abu Husayn, T. Khalidi, and S. A. Mourad (eds.), *In the House of Understanding: Histories in Memory of Kamal S. Salibi*. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, pp. 373–388.

29 Boisard, Marcel A. 1988. *Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace*. Plainfield: American Trust Publication.

30 Ghannouchi, Rachid. 1993. 'The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government', in A. Tamimi (ed.), *Power-Sharing Islam?*, pp. 51–63. London: Liberty for Muslim World A. Publications. Ghannouchi is the founder of the Nahda Party in Tunisia.

31 I am presenting here a certain idealisation of modern European civilisation, which I admit is biased on my part.